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Abstract  
Transparency in resource revenue management is frequently cited as an important strategy to avoid 
misuse and misappropriation. The underlying theory proposes that transparency will allow citizens to 
gain (more) information on their country’s revenues and their management; better informed citizens in 
turn will  be able to contribute to the debate on national resource governance issues, voice their 
concerns, and demand improved accountability if necessary. However, there is little micro-level 
evidence so far to show how transparency policies actually relate to better citizen knowledge, or to any 
difference in attitudes towards revenue management and in demand for accountability. To address these 
points, we analyze data from a unique survey of over 3500 Ghanaian citizens to understand how 
Ghana’s extractive sector transparency measures are linked to citizens’ knowledge, rights perception, 
satisfaction levels, and behavior regarding resource revenue management. Our results suggest that 
information levels among citizens are generally quite poor; however, there is a strong sense of citizens’ 
right to benefit from resource revenues. Satisfaction with the current use of natural resource revenues 
is very low; yet, few respondents have sought more information, or even discussed resource revenue 
management with friends or family. The results also hold for elected representatives, who should be 
best placed to influence resource governance. The findings imply that the transparency discourse may 
hinge on false assumptions of the effects of information in resource revenue management. If the policy 
is to work as a way of increasing accountability of government towards citizens, the focus may need to 
shift to informing civil society organizations in particular, rather than simply making information 
available as widely as possible. 
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1. Introduction  
Many developing countries heavily rely on their natural resource sectors to raise the revenues 
necessary to develop their economies and provide improved living conditions for their citizens. 
However, if not managed judiciously, their natural resource endowments can turn into a 
“resource curse”, a phenomenon characterized by slow economic growth, weak political 
institutions, and even violent conflict (van der Ploeg 2011). The mismanagement of resource 
revenues has often been cited as a root cause of the resource curse, which thrives on opacity in 
resource revenue management. The promotion of transparency in revenue management is 
therefore frequently advised by the international community (Haufler 2010), or even made a 
prerequisite for obtaining aid, loans and investment from donors and extractive companies 
(David-Barrett and Okamura, 2016; Kasekende et al. 2016). The underlying assumption is that 
transparency will allow citizens to gain (more) information on their country’s resource 
revenues and their management. Better informed citizens, in turn, will be able to contribute to 
a national debate on resource governance issues, voice their concerns, and demand more 
accountability from their governments when necessary (Epremian et al. 2016; Fox 2015; Gillies 
and Heuty 2011; Lujala and Epremian 2017). Ultimately, transparency would then lead to 
improved revenue management and public spending, and lower corruption levels. 
This article addresses two crucial questions that arise from the theory of transparency: first, 
is transparency in fact linked to better-informed citizens? And second, does transparency 
influence citizens’ views on resource revenue governance and shape their related behavior? To 
understand these relationships, we make use of a unique national survey of over 3500 
Ghanaians. The survey focused on citizens’ knowledge levels on natural resource revenues – 
particularly petroleum and mining revenues – and the institutions that govern them; their 
attitudes towards the current use of resource revenues, including their perception of politicians’ 
and their own rights regarding resource revenue use; and their willingness to seek more 
information and take action to influence how resource revenues are used.  
Ghana provides an interesting case study: it has a long history of resource extraction, 
particularly gold mining (Ghana being the second largest African gold producer after South 
Africa), and in 2007, it discovered offshore petroleum. Petroleum production began in 2010, 
and in 2011, the Ghanaian Parliament passed the Petroleum Revenue Management Act 
(PRMA, Act 815), which provides the framework for the collection, allocation and 
management of petroleum revenues in a responsible, transparent and accountable manner for 
the benefit of the citizens of Ghana. The PRMA and its associated institutions – the Public 
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Interest Accountability Committee (PIAC, an independent public oversight body), the Annual 
Budget Funding Amount (ABFA, which receives and allocates 70% of the petroleum revenues 
to development projects throughout the country), and the Stabilization and Heritage funds – 
have been viewed as model attempts to provide transparency and accountability in resource 
revenue governance. Ghana has since 2003 also participated in the Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative (EITI), the most widely implemented and supported transnational 
transparency initiative within natural resource governance.  
Several years have passed since joining the EITI and the implementation of the PRMA, so 
it is time to take stock of the situation and see whether the efforts at transparency have borne 
fruit. Previous studies suggest that citizens in communities close to Ghana’s offshore oil fields 
have little knowledge of the petroleum sector and its revenue management (Ofori and Lujala 
2015), and that even members of the District Assemblies – the main tier of the decentralized 
governance structure in Ghana – have poor access to general information and make policy 
decisions based on memory and experience (Fiankor and Akussah 2012).5  
Our basic hypothesis is that better-informed respondents are more assertive about their 
rights and take more action for accountability. The main channel is assumed to be a weakening 
of the perceived barriers to action (i.e., the “voice” option becomes cheaper, see Hirschman 
1970). We have no definite prior on how knowledge levels affect satisfaction with the status 
quo; but we do expect that respondents with more assertive attitudes and lower satisfaction 
with the status quo take more action because they are more motivated to do so. We expect 
elected representatives at lower administrative levels – the District Assembly and Unit 
Committee members – to have especially high incentives to monitor the management of 
resource revenue, as it potentially directly affects their constituencies.6  
We find some encouraging results regarding the relation between information on revenue 
use and individual behavior, suggesting that better knowledge levels are linked to the frequency 
at which these issues are discussed informally, and the number of times citizens contact 
someone to gain more information. At the same time, our results also make it clear that there 
is much room for improvement both in disseminating information relating to resource revenue 
use, and in encouraging citizens – and elected leaders – to voice their concerns. Finally, we 
find no discernible difference between information on or satisfaction with the management of 
                                                 
5 Ghana’s decentralized governance structure has three main tiers: the Regional Councils at the top; the District 
Assemblies – shorthand for Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies – in the middle; and the Unit 
Committees at the bottom. The most power in this system rests with the District Assemblies (FES 2016). 
6 We consequently oversampled these elected representatives in our survey in order to have enough statistical 
power. 
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petroleum revenues and mining revenues, perhaps because most citizens do not clearly 
differentiate the two.  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the theory of transparency; Section 3 
briefly describes how Ghana manages its resource revenues and transparency’s role in it; 
Section 4 explains the survey data and empirical methodology; Section 5 presents the main 
results; and Section 6 concludes. 
2. The theory of transparency  
There is no commonly agreed definition of transparency. Transparency can be defined 
narrowly as “the increased flow of timely and reliable economic, social and political 
information which is accessible to all relevant stakeholders” (Bellver and Kaufman 2005, p. 
4), or broadly as “the degree to which information is available to outsiders that enables them 
to have informed voices in decision and/or to access the decisions made by the insiders” 
(Florini 2007, p. 5). The narrow definition of transparency restricts the concept to information 
disclosure, whereas the broader definition goes beyond mere disclosure to look at the ability of 
the receiver to assimilate, process and utilise the information made available (Epremian et al. 
2016).   
Although transparency has some intrinsic value, the term has been popularized largely by 
its instrumental value, i.e. as a means to an end (Buijze 2013). It is universally accepted as one 
of the cardinal pillars of good governance and regarded as (one of) the panacea(s) to many of 
the governance and developmental challenges of our time. According to Buijze (2013, p.4), 
transparency is desirable “because it promotes democracy, trust in public institutions, or market 
efficiency”. In the context of the management of revenues from high-value natural resources, 
transparency is seen as the principal means of avoiding or mitigating the infamous resource 
curse in developing countries, since it provides the platform for better management of natural 
resources and the associated revenues. 
The transparency theory is underpinned by an assumption that the provision of information 
will lead to citizen action, which will then lead to official government response (Joshi 2013). 
In order words, the more information is available to the public, the more empowered and active 
the public and civil society actors will become, who will in turn subject government actions to 
public scrutiny, making government more responsive to the citizenry (Epremian et al. 2016). 
Most transparency-based policies and initiatives in the extractive industry are premised on this 
unidirectional causal chain of relationship between the intervention and desired outcomes.  
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According to Epremian et al. (2016), the principal-agent framework represents, either 
explicitly or implicitly, the basis for arguments calling for greater transparency in natural 
resource revenue governance. An agency problem arises whenever there is information 
asymmetry, and hence the need to improve the openness and availability of information in the 
attempt to control corruption (Stiglitz 2007). By remedying the information asymmetry 
between the principal and the agent, the principal prevents the latter from exploiting his 
information advantage (Buijze 2012).   
In the specific case of natural resource revenues, redressing the information imbalance 
about revenue transfers and spending through information disclosure is seen as a key to making 
the public more aware of how government is operating. An informed public is then expected 
to force the government, through elections or advocacy, to be more accountable with respect 
to natural resource governance in general and, in particular, how it spends natural resource 
revenues (Epremian et al. 2016)  
Figure 1 presents the impact of transparency as a causal process, in which increased 
information enables a series of causal stages ending in improved societal and economic 
development outcomes. Each stage acts as an instrument for bringing about the next stage, with 
the arrows signifying both the direction of causality as well as the number of key assumptions 
necessary for the model to hold (Epremian et al, 2016; Lujala and Epremian, 2017). 
 
Figure 1. The transparency narrative in natural resource revenue management (Source: 
























In this article, we focus on the links between the second box through to the fifth box in the 
chain. Specifically, we analyse how the provision of information through the transparency 
initiatives in Ghana relate to knowledge levels, attitudes and bahavior of the citizenry towards 
revenue management. The role of information in influencing behavioral outcomes is based on 
standard economic assumptions of rational choice theory, which results in linear models of 
behavior. But does information on natural resource revenues in fact relate to knowledge levels, 
as well as to attitudes and behavior of the citizenry towards the management of revenues? 
We focus on these short-term and intermediate outcomes as there exists little rigorous 
empirical research on the impact of natural resource revenue-related information on knowledge 
levels, attitudes and behavior of the citizenry (see Lujala and Epremian 2017). Armand et al. 
(2018) evaluate the impact of a large information campaign relating to natural gas discovery 
on knowledge, awareness, elite capture, rent-seeking and citizen mobilization, trust and 
accountability in northern Mozambique. They implemented a large-scale randomized field 
experiment and found, among others, that a community-targeted information campaign was 
effective in raising awareness and knowledge of citizens; that information given to leaders 
increased elite capture and rent-seeking; and that providing the general population information 
and the opportunity for deliberation increased mobilization, trust, and voice, and decreased 
violence.  
Our paper provides further evidence and helps deepen understanding about how 
information disclosure regarding natural resource revenues influences knowledge, attitudes and 
behavior of citizens and duty bearers in the long run.  
3. Ghana’s natural resource revenue management 
Ghana is endowed with substantial mineral resources. Commercially exploited minerals in 
Ghana include gold, manganese, bauxite, diamonds and, more recently, hydrocarbons. Ghana’s 
mining sector played a significant role in the socio-economic development of the country 
during the colonial and post-colonial eras. Not only has the mining sector consistently been the 
highest gross foreign exchange earner in Ghana for most of the past three decades, but it is also 
the largest tax-paying sector in the country and makes a significant contribution to GDP 
(Ministry of Finance 2018).  
Until the discovery of oil and gas in commercial quantities in 2007, gold was by far the 
economically most important mineral resource, contributing over 90% of the country’s total 
mineral revenue. However, despite the substantial revenues generated by the mining sector, 
Ghana has had very little to show in terms of social and economic development. For example, 
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Ayee et al. (2011) describe the disappointingly small contribution of mining to the overall 
development of the national economy, while Adusei (2008) points to the deplorable state or 
even absence of physical infrastructure and social amenities in mining communities, 
concluding that environmental costs are the main effect these areas have seen. According to 
the World Bank (2003), local communities affected by large-scale mining had witnessed little 
benefit in the form of improved infrastructure or service provision, because most of the rents 
from mining are used to finance recurrent, not capital expenditure.  
Ghana’s failure to translate the massive mineral wealth earned over the past century into 
broad-based and inclusive economic development, coupled with the significant environmental 
degradation caused by mining, created a lot of skepticism and despondency among citizenry at 
the time oil was discovered. With gold largely deemed a “lost cause”, there was a national 
consensus and resolve to ensure that Ghana would manage its oil resources better than its 
mining resources. Consequently, the Parliament of Ghana passed the PRMA in 2011, designed 
to guide the collection, allocation and management of petroleum revenues. The development 
of the Act was informed by four main guiding principles: 1) To ensure the availability of 
additional revenue to support the national budget; 2) To minimize potential negative effects on 
the management of the economy in general and on public spending in particular; 3) To 
maximize transparency and accountability in collection, management and use of petroleum 
revenue; and, 4) To provide savings for future generations.  
Point 1 is mainly captured by the funds allocated to the ABFA; however, although used for 
development projects across the country, the funds have generally contributed only part of the 
overall financing of any one project, and it is unclear whether the local population is aware of 
the use of petroleum money in their area (Edjekumhene et al. 2018).  
Point 3 is of particular relevance for the present analysis. The PRMA imposes on state 
institutions mandatory periodic reporting in their management of petroleum receipts and 
expenditure. The Act also stipulated the establishment of PIAC, which is responsible for 
ensuring compliance with the Act. Among other responsibilities, PIAC is to engage with 
citizens to increase knowledge and awareness of petroleum revenue management, and to 
monitor and improve citizen’s capability and willingness to hold the government accountable 
in managing and spending petroleum revenues. PIAC is required by the Act to publish two 
reports per year – a semi-annual report due by September 15 and an annual report due by March 
15 of every year – and is mandated to actively create a platform to gather citizens’ comments 
and present them to Parliament and the Presidency along with their reports. So far, PIAC has 
published thirteen reports – six semi-annual and seven annual reports. It has regularly presented 
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and discussed these reports before Public Accounts and Finance Committees of Parliament. 
The Committee has also occasionally travelled to regional and district capitals to hold public 
information meetings. 
Apart from the PMRA, the management of Ghana’s natural resource revenues is also 
subjected to the EITI principles, which Ghana signed up to as one of the pilot countries in 2003 
at the first EITI meeting in London, becoming an EITI compliant country in 2010.7 Although, 
the scope of Ghana EITI (GHEITI) was limited to revenue transparency in the beginning, the 
current EITI Standards require vastly broader information disclosure, covering areas such as 
production volumes, export data, revenue management, quasi-fiscal expenditures, and 
recommended disclosure of contracts and beneficial ownership, through the annual EITI 
reports and other means (EITI 2016). In Ghana, plans are afoot to legislate the EITI into law 
and a draft EITI Bill is currently before the Ghanaian Parliament for consideration and passage 
into an Act. 
Thus, the provision of information on revenues from Ghana’s mining and oil and gas sectors 
and their utilization has been the bedrock of the GHEITI and the PRMA. But have they resulted 
in a population that is well-informed about resource governance and that is willing to take 
action to demand accountability? 
4. Data and empirical methodology  
We use a unique dataset based on a large survey carried out in June-August 2016 by the Kumasi 
Institute for Technology, Energy and Environment (KITE) in Ghana.8 The purpose of the 
survey was to study people’s level of knowledge of and perceptions and attitudes towards a 
number of petroleum and mining revenue management related issues, and to study how people 
inform themselves about these issues and what action they have taken to influence resource 
revenue management either locally or nationally. The survey sample consists of 3526 adult (18 
and over) respondents. The respondents were interviewed face-to-face by locally recruited 
enumerators.  
A combination of blocking and clustering was used in sampling: first, 120 of Ghana’s 216 
districts were selected, including all coastal districts close to the offshore petroleum platforms 
                                                 
7 To become ‘EITI compliant’, a country needs to pass a validation that assesses it against the requirements set by 
the EITI Standard (EITI 2016). The annual EITI Report is the core EITI product. It contains the data on the 
country’s extractives industries in accordance with the EITI Standard (see https://eiti.org/document/guidance-
note-on-publishing-eiti-data). For a more detailed account of how the EITI came into existence, how it 
functions, and what its objectives are, see Hauﬂer (2010), Öge (2016), Van Alstine (2017) and Lujala (2018). 
For a recent overview of the literature on the EITI’s impact, see Rustad et al. (2017). 
8 The survey is part of a field experiment conducted between June 2016 and September 2017. 
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(termed “oil districts”) and 25 mining districts. The remaining 89 districts were randomly 
selected with probability proportional to population size. The districts included in the survey 
are shown in Figure 2. Second, five electoral areas were randomly chosen in each selected 
district. One District Assembly member (DA) per electoral area was randomly selected from a 
list obtained from the District Administration. The selected DA was contacted and an 
appointment made to meet in their electoral area; in addition, each DA was asked to suggest 
one Unit Committee (UC) member; one chief or other prime member of the traditional 
authority such as a Queen Mother; and one other opinion leader (e.g., a journalist) in their 
electoral area.9 Lastly, two ordinary citizens (1 male and 1 female) were randomly selected in 
each electoral area.10 The sampling structure therefore targeted 30 respondents per selected 
district, with an average 26 respondents per district included in the survey. The coastal districts 
close to offshore petroleum production areas, and the districts with mining operations, were 
oversampled, as were local leaders in each electoral area. Due to gender structures in Ghana, 
women are underrepresented among the decision makers, but women make up 50% of the 
common citizens’ sample by design.  
4.1 Dependent variables 
In our analysis, we use three sets of dependent variables: one for knowledge levels, one for 
attitudes towards oil and gas and mining revenue management, and one for individual 
behavior.11  
Knowledge. We measure current knowledge levels with three different proxies. The first 
one includes answers to the questions on whether the respondent had received information 
within the past twelve months on how oil, gas or mining revenues are handled in Ghana and in 
their area, with yes (coded as 1) and no (coded as 0) as the answer alternatives.12 National-level 
information on oil, gas or mining revenues was relatively low (30.8% had received 
                                                 
9 In case a UC member, traditional authority or other opinion leader could not be reached, another opinion leader 
was added instead. The non-random selection of these duty bearers was chosen as there are no reliable lists 
available. 
10 Two enumerators first agreed on who would interview a male and female respondent, alternating respondent 
gender across electoral areas. Then the two enumerators each went in two opposite directions, counting 100 
steps from the spot where the team met the DA, ensuring that electoral area borders were not crossed; then, 
the closest person of the selected gender willing to participate in the survey was interviewed.  
11 Table A in the Appendix reports summary statistics, full survey question(s), and answer alternatives for each 
variable used. 
12 We initially look at local and national level information reception separately as well as the overall measure, but 
then concentrate on the combined measure. For all variables, missing answers and answers “I do not know” 
or “I do not want to answer” were dropped.  
10 
information), and local-level information very low (6.7%); overall, 31.4% had received 
information at some level.  
 
Figure 2. Map of Ghana showing survey districts.  
Our second knowledge measure is a count variable from 0 to 4 for whether the respondent 
had heard of one or more of the following: the GHEITI, PRMA, ABFA, and PIAC. 
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Respondents overwhelmingly said they had not heard of the PRMA (63%), the ABFA (87%), 
the GHEITI (95%), or PIAC (77%).13  
Our final knowledge measure gauges individuals’ self-assessed knowledge about what 
happens to revenues from oil and gas production and from mining. The answers are measured 
on a four-point scale going from 0 (No knowledge) to 3 (Good knowledge). Around 67% of 
respondents admitted to having no knowledge about oil and gas or mining revenue 
management, around 32 % said they had some knowledge; and a meagre 1.3% claimed to have 
good knowledge of at least one of two revenue types. Women were always more likely to report 
less knowledge than men. Differences in knowledge levels between the resource types were 
minimal and the correlation between the two variables is 0.84.   
Attitudes. We measure attitudes by including respondents’ (1) satisfaction levels with the 
current handling of oil and gas or mining revenues, and (2) perception of citizens’ rights 
regarding resource revenue management. We measure satisfaction with oil and gas revenue 
and mining revenue management, respectively, using a five-point Likert scale from 0 
(completely dissatisfied) to 4 (completely satisfied). Seventy six percent (76%) of respondents 
express dissatisfaction with the handling of oil and gas revenues, and 78% are dissatisfied with 
the handling of mining revenues. We also measure attitudes regarding local elected politicians’ 
and traditional leaders’ right to receive a share of resource revenues as compensation for their 
services: interestingly, only 23% completely disagree that neither of these authorities should 
receive a share of revenues, and 28% completely agree that both groups have the right to 
receive a share of the revenues as a compensation. Respondents have strong views regarding 
their rights to benefit from revenues, demand information, and demand better handling of 
revenues: 99% agree that they have the right to benefit from resource revenues; 95% agree that 
they have the right to demand relevant information; and 96% agree that they have the right to 
demand better handling of revenues. All three variables are measured on a five-point Likert 
scale going from 0 (completely disagree) to 4 (completely agree).  
Behavior. The third and final set of dependent variables measures individual behavior: we 
asked respondents whether in the previous year they had discussed the usage of oil, gas or 
mining revenues with friends, family or colleagues. This is a low-level indicator of active 
citizen interest in resource revenue management, yet only 21% (717) of respondents answered 
in the affirmative. To measure more costly citizen engagement, we then inquired whether they 
                                                 
13 Note that these questions were based on respondents’ self-assessment. Of the few (mostly male) respondents 
who said they had heard of these institutions, less than half were able to describe them (partly) correctly when 
asked to do so. 
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had contacted anyone over the previous year to ask about the handling of resource revenues, 
and only 6.4% (224) told us they had.14 Both variables are coded as dummies with ‘yes’ taking 
the value of 1. In addition to these general behavioral questions, we asked DA and UC members 
and traditional leaders specifically about how many times in the past year they had discussed 
revenues from oil, gas or mining in meetings with their peers. The variables take value of 0 for 
‘Never’, 1 for ‘Once’, 2 for ‘2-3 times’ and 3 for ‘more than 3 times’. 95% (572) of UC 
members, 92% (515) of DA members, and 87% (334) of traditional leaders had never discussed 
the issue. These numbers demonstrate that resource revenues are even less of a topic among 
elected and non-elected leaders than in our sample as a whole.  
Overall, we get a picture of poor levels of knowledge regarding resource revenue 
management, yet high levels of dissatisfaction with the status quo, and very little active interest 
in revenue management, with hardly any difference between the recent oil and gas revenues 
and the long-existing mining revenues. In order to devise a better way of disseminating 
information on resource revenues, particularly oil and gas revenues, and making transparency 
matter for the average citizen and the local leaders, we need to understand which factors are 
linked to each of our outcomes, i.e. include a set of relevant control variables. Variation in most 
outcomes we use is low, which makes the task particularly challenging. 
4.2 Explanatory variables  
Our individual-level controls include gender; education levels; information access (i.e., 
personal or household ownership of a radio, television, or mobile phone);15 general interest in 
political and public affairs; and general satisfaction with government. Note that education 
levels and media ownership can also be interpreted as proxies for income levels. In the context 
of our survey, we also add a dummy variable for whether any mining or oil company operated 
in or near the respondent’s area, based on the premise that being close to a resource production 
site increases the local population’s awareness of resource revenues management.16 
Furthermore, we include a dummy for whether the respondent was a DA or UC member, 
traditional leader, or other opinion leader, the common citizen group being the reference 
category.  
                                                 
14 The most popular contacts cited were a District Assembly member (48.4% or 106 respondents); a non-elected 
local official (31.5% or 70); a Unit Committee member or a traditional leader (both contacted by 28% or 62 
respondents); and an MP (25.5% or 57).  
15 We also asked about ownership of or access to other types of information media such as newspapers or internet, 
but these were much less frequent. 
16 We alternatively included a dummy for oil or mining districts, but this was only significant in the specifications 
relating to leaders’ behaviour, so we prefer using the more localized information on resource production in a 
respondent’s local area in all estimations. 
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We include dummies for (mostly) urban districts, as well as regional dummies. In some 
estimations, we used the outcome variables for Knowledge as controls,17 in others we also 
control for the general level of satisfaction with government. Finally, we control for different 
potential reasons for passivity by including variables that measure respondent’s agreement with 
statements on revenue management not being their responsibility, being afraid of reprisals, and 
not receiving information even if they had demanded it.  
4.3 Methodology 
To test the hypotheses described above, we examine in turn which factors are linked with each 
of our three sets of dependent variables. We show results from OLS regressions for all 
dependent variables y for respondent i in district d according to the following model:18 
𝑦௜ௗ = 𝑎 + 𝛼𝑏௥ + 𝛽ଵ𝑋௜ௗ + 𝛽ଶ𝑉ௗ + 𝜀௜ௗ, 
where X and V are vectors of the control variables at the individual level and district level, 
respectively; b is a dummy variable for region r; a is the constant term; and ε is the error term.  
We include sampling weights to correct for the oversampling of local leaders, males, and 
higher income households. We also include information about the sampling design – the 
blocking, clustering and stratification – in our analysis. In the first stage, we sampled districts 
and thus we use districts as our primary sampling unit. The districts were drawn from three 
strata: oil districts, mining districts, and all the other districts with stratum sizes of 6, 25 and 
185, respectively. The primary sample units were sampled randomly within the ‘no oil/no 
mining’ stratum, but all oil and mining districts were included in the survey. The variance 
estimates are calculated using the three strata and the total stratum sizes with the finite 
population correction. Our survey design included second-level clustering on the electoral area; 
for each district, five electoral areas were drawn randomly from the Electoral Commission’s 
list of Electoral Areas. As each district includes a different number of electoral areas, we adjust 
the variance estimates by including total number of electoral areas in finite population 
correction. Standard errors are estimated using Taylor linearized variance estimation.19 
                                                 
17 The variable on knowledge of institutions has been collapsed to a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the 
respondent had indicated to know at least one revenue management related institution. 
18 We show the corresponding results for logistic and ordered logistic regressions in Appendices 2-6. The results 
mirror closely the OLS regression results, the few exceptions are noted in the text.  
19 The three subsamples of UC and DA members, and traditional leaders, are analysed without weighting to 
account for the substantial differences with regard to the rest of our sample population. The DA and UC 
member subsample estimations use a one-step clustering approach, while the traditional leader subsample 
estimations use no stratification at all due to issues with singleton strata (i.e. some clusters have no or only 
one respondent from this subsample). Anonymized replication data file and detailed replication instructions 
will be made available upon publication of the article. STATA 15.1 was used in the analysis.  
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5. Estimation results 
In the following, we analyse each of our three dependent variable categories – knowledge, 
attitudes and behavior – in turn. The results for knowledge are presented in Table 1, for attitudes 
in Tables 2 and 3, and for behavior in Tables 4 and 5.  
5.1 Knowledge levels 
In Table 1, we first look at respondents’ information reception (Columns 1-3) about oil, gas or 
mining revenue management and then their knowledge levels about institutions related to oil 
and gas revenue management (Column 4) and revenue management in general (Columns 5 and 
6). Column 1 shows that respondents who indicated that there was oil or mining production in 
their local area were nearly 10 percentage points (pp) more likely to have received any 
information during the previous year on how revenues from oil, gas or mining are handled. 
Those with a radio in their household were 8 pp more likely to have received information, 
which together with the strong positive link with education levels suggests that there is an 
income effect in information reception. We also find that while gender plays no role, the 
respondent’s role in society does matter: DA members, traditional leaders and other opinion 
leaders are respectively 14, 22, and 8 pp more likely than common citizens to have heard about 
oil, gas or mining in the last twelve months. Finally, respondents who indicated a high general 
interest in politics were also more likely to have received information.  
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Table 1. Knowledge of resource revenues and institutions 
 
Notes: Table shows coefficients for OLS regressions. All specifications include regional dummies and a constant 
term (not shown). S.e. are clustered at the district and electoral area level. T-statistics in parentheses.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
There are some noteworthy differences between national-level (Column 2) and local 
information (Column 3) about the handling of oil, gas or mining revenues: education and 
political interest levels do not influence local information reception, and traditional leaders are 
no more likely to have received local information than common citizens. UC and DA members 
are 4 pp less likely to have received information about how resources revenues are managed in 
their area than common citizens. A plausible explanation for this seemingly counterintuitive 
finding lies in the very low outcome variation described above, so it may be spurious.  
Column 4 explores the factors related to self-expressed knowledge levels about the 
institutions related to resource revenue management and columns 5-6 the management of oil, 
gas and mining revenues. We see that women generally claim lower knowledge levels, 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)





Female -0.006 -0.010 -0.000 -0.316*** -0.074*** -0.069***
(-0.29) (-0.46) (-0.01) (-8.96) (-3.00) (-2.73)
Urban district -0.005 0.000 -0.011 0.032 0.013 0.016
(-0.24) (0.02) (-0.97) (0.99) (0.71) (0.84)
Education level 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.001 0.094*** 0.034*** 0.032***
(3.48) (3.42) (0.43) (13.89) (8.32) (7.38)
Oil or mining nearby 0.099*** 0.091*** 0.065*** 0.089* 0.057* 0.123***
(3.46) (3.31) (3.52) (1.68) (1.87) (3.93)
Radio ownership 0.081*** 0.077*** 0.045*** 0.085* 0.055** 0.056***
(2.96) (2.82) (2.89) (1.75) (2.44) (2.73)
TV ownership 0.032 0.029 0.025* 0.070* 0.030 0.066***
(1.25) (1.13) (1.73) (1.91) (1.38) (3.15)
Mobile phone ownership -0.019 -0.018 -0.051 0.057 0.034 0.021
(-0.45) (-0.42) (-1.53) (0.93) (1.32) (0.83)
Political interest 0.021*** 0.020*** 0.005 0.026** 0.043*** 0.037***
(3.12) (2.89) (1.25) (2.52) (6.76) (5.66)
District Assembly member 0.136*** 0.139*** -0.036** 0.197*** 0.224*** 0.240***
(3.99) (4.13) (-2.55) (3.05) (5.82) (6.35)
Unit Committee member 0.014 0.023 -0.038*** 0.092* 0.065** 0.097***
(0.53) (0.90) (-4.00) (1.89) (2.36) (3.27)
Traditional leader 0.217*** 0.221*** 0.022 0.145*** 0.185*** 0.230***
(7.16) (7.29) (1.49) (2.69) (5.08) (5.98)
Opinion leader 0.078*** 0.081*** 0.045*** 0.008 0.113*** 0.136***
(2.93) (3.09) (2.76) (0.20) (3.84) (4.63)
Observations 3,440 3,414 3,411 3,437 3,431 3,428
Number of disricts 120 120 120 120 120 120
R-squared 0.085 0.084 0.050 0.219 0.162 0.170
Information on oil and mining Knowledge
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particularly when it comes to the specific institutions of the PRMA, ABFA, GHEITI, and PIAC 
in column 4: female respondents are nearly 32 pp less likely to say they know (any of) these 
institutions.20 More educated respondents, all types of local leaders, and politically more 
interested respondents are more likely to profess greater knowledge of institutions, and of the 
management of oil and gas and mining revenues (Columns 5-6), as are those respondents with 
a radio or TV in the household, and with oil or mining nearby.  
5.2 Attitudes towards resource revenue management 
Columns 1-3 in Table 2 report the results for satisfaction with the handling of oil and gas 
revenues, and columns 4-6 for satisfaction with the handling of mining revenues. Columns 1 
and 4 use the same model specification as Table 1; Columns 2 and 5 add additional variables 
for knowledge on revenue management; and Columns 3 and 6 add a measure for general 
satisfaction with the Government of Ghana.  
A general tendency across specifications is that factors affecting the satisfaction levels for 
both types of revenues go in the same direction. The only detectable difference is mobile phone 
ownership, which is linked to slightly lower satisfaction with oil and gas revenue management, 
but has no relation with mining revenues. The presence of an extractive industry company in 
the area has a negative effect on satisfaction levels, as has radio ownership (TV has a similar, 
but even weaker effect). Those who are more engaged with political issues also view current 
revenue management more critically. Knowledge about resource revenue management does 
not affect respondents’ satisfaction levels; but those who tend to be more satisfied with the 
government in general are considerably more likely to be satisfied with how resource revenues 
are being handled. In fact, inclusion of government satisfaction in the specification 
substantially increases the explanatory power of the model: the R-squared jumps from 10% to 
around 30%. Women report higher satisfaction levels, but this result is only significant in 






                                                 
20 Recall that these subjective knowledge assessments are not necessarily a true indicator of actual knowledge, as 
demonstrated by the limited overlap between professed and actual knowledge of institutions mentioned above.  
21 The ordered logistic estimations produce somewhat stronger results for women, indicating that women may be 
in general more satisfied with how mineral resource revenues are handled (Appendix 3, Columns 4-6).  
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Table 2. Satisfaction with resource revenue management  
 
Notes: Table shows coefficients for OLS regressions. All specifications include regional dummies and a constant 
term (not shown). S.e. are clustered at the district and electoral area level. T-statistics in parentheses.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Further, the results indicate that the elected local leaders and other opinion leaders tend to 
be more satisfied with revenue management than common citizens. The traditional leaders may 
be less satisfied as indicated by the negative coefficients (which, however, are not significant 
at conventional levels). It is noteworthy that education level does not affect satisfaction levels, 
and that there is no urban-rural divide.  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Oil  Oil  Oil Mining Mining Mining 
Female 0.075 0.055 0.198*** 0.098 0.087 0.230***
(0.91) (0.66) (2.74) (1.25) (1.08) (3.36)
Urban district -0.029 -0.026 -0.011 0.003 0.004 0.029
(-0.44) (-0.39) (-0.18) (0.05) (0.06) (0.49)
Education level 0.024 0.022 0.014 0.005 0.004 -0.001
(1.66) (1.40) (1.08) (0.42) (0.31) (-0.11)
Oil  or mining nearby -0.147** -0.180** -0.129* -0.167** -0.184** -0.148**
(-1.99) (-2.45) (-1.82) (-2.40) (-2.57) (-2.19)
Radio ownership -0.259* -0.272* -0.204 -0.279* -0.287* -0.228
(-1.68) (-1.76) (-1.34) (-1.75) (-1.81) (-1.42)
TV ownership -0.148 -0.151* -0.036 -0.128 -0.131 -0.029
(-1.65) (-1.69) (-0.45) (-1.40) (-1.44) (-0.34)
Mobile phone ownership -0.339* -0.340* -0.215 0.010 0.013 0.122
(-1.79) (-1.81) (-1.08) (0.06) (0.07) (0.58)
Political  interest -0.087*** -0.091*** -0.041** -0.083*** -0.088*** -0.041**
(-3.79) (-4.00) (-2.01) (-3.91) (-4.15) (-2.16)
District Assembly member 0.144 0.119 -0.049 0.207** 0.179* 0.026
(1.57) (1.27) (-0.63) (2.28) (1.92) (0.34)
Unit Committee member 0.248*** 0.245** 0.122 0.275*** 0.269*** 0.124
(2.64) (2.61) (1.40) (3.01) (2.94) (1.42)
Traditional  leader -0.093 -0.138 -0.076 -0.022 -0.063 0.002
(-0.93) (-1.35) (-0.83) (-0.23) (-0.63) (0.02)
Opinion leader 0.325*** 0.305*** 0.189** 0.321*** 0.299*** 0.204**









Observations 2,869 2,864 2,779 2,910 2,905 2,818
Number of disricts 120 120 120 120 120 120
R-squared 0.108 0.112 0.310 0.103 0.106 0.289
Satisfaction with government
Knowledge of revenue management
Knowledge of institutions (dummy)
Received information on revenue 
management 
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 Table 3 presents the results for respondents’ perceptions on their rights with regard to 
natural resource revenues. Columns 1-3 report the results for the respondents’ perception on 
whether local politicians have a right to a share of resource revenues as a compensation for 
their services. Columns 4-6 show respondents’ perception of their own right to benefit from 
revenues; Columns 7-9 of the right to demand more information; and Columns 10-12 the right 
to demand better handling of revenues 
Those with a higher level of education clearly do not support the idea that local leaders have 
the right to take a share of revenues as compensation for their services. They are also more 
likely to assert that they have the right to obtain more information about, and better handling 
of, resource revenues. There is some evidence that education levels are also related to higher 
expectations regarding the right to benefit from the revenues.22 Women are more likely to 
report weaker perceptions of their rights to demand more information about and better handling 
of revenues, but gender does not seem to affect views on local leaders’ having the right to a 
part of the revenues, nor respondents’ sense of their own right to benefit from revenues. 
Respondents living in areas with an extractive company are slightly more likely to report 
having the right to benefit from revenues.23  
Those with a radio are more supportive of the idea that local leaders have a right to a share 
of revenues, and radio ownership decreases the likelihood of a respondent feeling the right to 
benefit themselves or to get more information and better handling of revenues. This significant 
variation is remarkable given that over 90% of respondents have a radio in their household. We 
know that radio is the main source of information for people in Ghana (Lujala et al. 2018); the 
type of information received may be influencing rights perceptions, but an analysis of media 
content is beyond the scope of this paper. TV and mobile phone ownership do not seem to be 
related to rights perceptions. Those who more often discuss political issues are less likely to 
accept that local leaders take a share of the revenues, and there is some evidence that they are 
more aware of their rights, especially when it comes to the right to expect a better handling of 
resource revenues.24 
UC members and traditional leaders are considerably more likely to state that local leaders 
have a right to a share of revenues, while the views of DA members and other opinion leaders 
are more similar to those of common citizens. Compared to common citizens, the DA members 
                                                 
22 The coefficient are significant at 0.12<p<0.15 level in the OLS estimations (Table 3, Columns 4-6) and at 
0.08<p<0.15 in ordered logistic estimations (Appendix 4, columns 4-6). 
23 This result is insignificant on ordered logistics estimations (Appendix 4, columns 4-6).  
24 The ordered logistic estimations suggest also that these respondents are more likely to report a higher level of 
right to benefit from natural resource revenues (Appendix 4, Columns 4-6).   
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and traditional chiefs are more inclined to claim a right to benefit from the revenues themselves, 
and DA and UC members are more likely to report having the right for more information about 
and better handling of revenues.  
Finally, those with knowledge of the PRMA, ABFA, GHEITI or PIAC more often accept 
local leaders’ taking a share of the revenues, while also having a stronger sense of rights with 
regard to getting more information and better handling of revenues – this appears contradictory. 
Higher levels of knowledge of revenue information, on the other hand, are related to a lower 
sense of rights to more information and better handling. Those who are more satisfied with the 
government are more likely to accept the local leaders’ taking a share of revenues and also 
think that they have a right to benefit from revenues themselves.25  
4.3 Behavior 
Our main measures of behavior are whether the respondent discussed the use of resource 
revenues with friends (Table 4, Columns 1-5), family or colleagues in the past year, and 
whether they contacted someone to specifically ask about revenue handling in the same period 
(Columns 6-10). The first measure has a very low threshold for action, while the second has a 
higher threshold; together, they should give us a good picture of who has sought or is 
potentially willing to seek more information on petroleum revenue management. Table 4 
reports the results using the full sample, and Table 5 for elected leaders (UC and DA members) 
and Table 6 for traditional authorities. We include survey participants’ rights perceptions and 
perceptions on meaningfulness of trying to influence resource revenue management as 
additional independent variables in some of the estimations.  
The results in Table 4 show that higher education levels and the presence of oil or mining 
activities nearby are positive predictors of behaviour, as are general political interest, and 
whether or not the respondent was a duty bearer (elected or traditional authority) or opinion 
leader. Having ready access to a source of information in the form of a radio increases the 
likelihood of discussing the issues (columns 1-5), but not of contacting someone (columns 6-
10). The results also suggest a positive relationship between living in an urban district and 
being more likely to discuss the issues.26   
                                                 
25 The ordered logistic estimations suggest that these respondents are also more likely to report a higher sense of 
rights to more information and better handling (Appendix 4, Columns 9 and 12).   
26 The coefficient are significant at 0.06<p<0.14 level in the OLS estimations (Table 4, Columns 1-5) and at 
0.06<p<0.10 in ordered logistic estimations (Appendix 5, Columns 1-5). 
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Table 3. Rights perception 
 
Notes: Table shows coefficients for OLS regressions. All specifications include regional dummies and a constant term (not shown). S.e. are clustered at the district and electoral 
area level. T-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
VARIABLES
Female -0.048 0.009 -0.028 -0.006 -0.009 0.002 -0.128*** -0.118*** -0.101*** -0.122*** -0.114*** -0.100***
(-0.59) (0.11) (-0.34) (-0.24) (-0.37) (0.09) (-3.81) (-3.58) (-3.05) (-3.72) (-3.60) (-3.07)
Urban district 0.076 0.069 0.072 0.012 0.012 0.011 -0.036 -0.039 -0.030 -0.024 -0.026 -0.021
(1.05) (0.94) (1.00) (0.50) (0.53) (0.44) (-0.93) (-0.99) (-0.83) (-0.60) (-0.65) (-0.55)
Education level -0.044*** -0.059*** -0.039** 0.006 0.007 0.006 0.029*** 0.024*** 0.024*** 0.031*** 0.028*** 0.027***
(-2.96) (-3.67) (-2.59) (1.46) (1.59) (1.54) (3.74) (3.08) (3.43) (4.11) (3.58) (4.02)
Oil or mining nearby 0.024 0.021 -0.017 0.039* 0.042* 0.041* -0.011 -0.009 0.029 0.007 0.013 0.050
(0.24) (0.21) (-0.16) (1.67) (1.75) (1.70) (-0.18) (-0.15) (0.57) (0.11) (0.21) (0.90)
Radio ownership 0.327** 0.314** 0.339** -0.092*** -0.090*** -0.082** -0.168*** -0.168*** -0.116** -0.169*** -0.166** -0.123**
(2.52) (2.44) (2.51) (-2.92) (-2.84) (-2.45) (-2.70) (-2.71) (-2.09) (-2.62) (-2.56) (-2.10)
TV ownership -0.075 -0.087 -0.045 -0.013 -0.011 -0.005 0.029 0.028 0.003 0.024 0.025 0.006
(-0.80) (-0.93) (-0.48) (-0.39) (-0.34) (-0.15) (0.53) (0.51) (0.05) (0.44) (0.46) (0.12)
Mobile phone ownership -0.089 -0.107 -0.091 0.025 0.026 0.036 0.075 0.074 0.124 0.030 0.030 0.064
(-0.51) (-0.61) (-0.51) (0.37) (0.37) (0.49) (0.66) (0.65) (1.09) (0.26) (0.26) (0.56)
Political interest -0.092*** -0.095*** -0.078*** 0.009 0.010 0.013** 0.013 0.014 0.011 0.021* 0.024** 0.016
(-3.57) (-3.63) (-3.03) (1.39) (1.55) (1.98) (1.18) (1.24) (1.05) (1.93) (2.14) (1.52)
District Assembly member 0.150 0.117 0.105 0.064** 0.071*** 0.047* 0.107*** 0.113*** 0.101*** 0.096*** 0.111*** 0.095***
(1.23) (0.99) (0.86) (2.62) (2.88) (1.94) (3.21) (3.27) (3.11) (3.01) (3.33) (3.07)
Unit Committee member 0.578*** 0.561*** 0.503*** 0.022 0.024 0.006 0.126*** 0.126*** 0.113*** 0.133*** 0.135*** 0.120***
(5.72) (5.58) (4.72) (0.90) (0.99) (0.24) (4.29) (4.20) (3.62) (4.52) (4.49) (3.75)
Traditional leader 0.688*** 0.679*** 0.687*** 0.095*** 0.102*** 0.095*** -0.001 0.003 -0.015 -0.009 0.006 -0.021
(6.61) (6.34) (6.59) (4.95) (5.30) (4.95) (-0.03) (0.05) (-0.31) (-0.16) (0.11) (-0.38)
Opinion leader -0.013 -0.015 -0.037 -0.007 -0.004 -0.015 -0.014 -0.003 -0.036 -0.010 0.005 -0.029
(-0.13) (-0.16) (-0.37) (-0.31) (-0.19) (-0.66) (-0.37) (-0.08) (-1.00) (-0.28) (0.14) (-0.80)
0.048 -0.019 0.038 0.009
(0.60) (-0.64) (0.99) (0.22)
0.284*** -0.011 0.094*** 0.090***
(3.63) (-0.41) (2.93) (2.89)
-0.012 -0.017 -0.075** -0.095***
(-0.16) (-0.63) (-2.23) (-2.91)
0.060** 0.032*** 0.017 0.012
(2.20) (4.91) (1.32) (0.85)
Observations 3,394 3,384 3,259 3,400 3,390 3,263 3,388 3,378 3,251 3,390 3,380 3,253
Number of disricts 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120
R-squared 0.082 0.088 0.085 0.061 0.062 0.070 0.094 0.098 0.086 0.089 0.093 0.081
Local leaders right to revenues Own right to benefits Right to demand information Right to demand better handling
Received information on 
revenue management 
Knowledge of institutions 
(dummy)





Encouragingly, we see that those who are better informed about resource revenue governance and on 
what is going on in the sector are much more likely to report both discussing the issues and contacting 
someone regarding the use of revenues (Columns 2 and 7). Although the likelihood of the latter only 
increases between 1.8-6.1 pp (Column 7), better knowledge increases the former by 8-15.8 pp (Column 2), 
which is encouraging. Note also that the explanatory power of our models increases substantially when we 
include the knowledge measures, as demonstrated by the R-squareds. 
Curiously, respondents who are more supportive of the right of local leaders to retain a share of revenues 
as compensation for their services are also slightly more likely to discuss revenue-related issues and more 
likely to contact someone (Columns 3 and 8). Perception of respondents’ own rights instead plays no role 
in explaining behavior.27 Finally, we note that fear of potential reprisals and a sense of pointlessness to any 
effort in this context reduce the likelihood of discussing the issues, though only by 1.2-2.4 pp, while the 
sense that it is not the respondent’s responsibility to become involved in revenue management surprisingly 
increases discussion (Column 4).  
We also asked duty-bearers and the chiefs in particular whether they had discussed the use of resource 
revenues during meetings with their peers over the past 12 months. Recall that we expect these respondents 
to have the greatest incentive to be informed about resource revenues due to their positions of authority, to 
influence revenue use, and desire for re-election (in the case of our elected UC and DA members). Results 
are shown in Table 5.  
We see that female DA members are less likely to have discussed revenue use; there is no strong gender 
effect among UC members or traditional authorities, likely because we have very few female respondents.28 
Curiously, the more educated UC members are the less likely, and the more educated DA members more 
likely, to have talked about revenue use. We have no ready explanation for this result.29 Having oil or 
mining activities nearby is linked to more frequent discussions with peers for UC and DA members, but 
less so for the chiefs. A general interest in politics is positively associated with discussion with peers for 
UC members’, but there is a significant negative relation to chiefs’ likelihood of discussing resource 
revenues. Mobile phone ownership has a strong positive relation with the likelihood of discussing revenues 
with peers for UC and DA members, but this result is driven by the fact that none of the very few DA (1) 
and UC (8) members without mobile phones discussed the revenues with peers (which is why these 
variables are dropped in the logit estimations, see Appendix 6, columns 1-6). 
                                                 
27 Note that due to a high correlation of 86% of the three personal rights measures, we only include two – the right to benefit 
from and the right to demand better handling of resource revenues – in our estimations. Results including the right to demand 
more information were very similar and are available upon request.   
28 Our sample includes 67 female UC members, 35 female DA members and 12 female chiefs. None of the female DA members 
had discussed the revenue use in their DA meetings; this variable thus is dropped in the logistic estimations (Appendix 6, 
Columns 4-6). 
29 The logit results for UC members are weaker. 
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Table 4. Individual behavior, full sample 
 
Notes: Table shows coefficients for OLS regressions. All specifications include regional dummies and a constant term (not 
shown). S.e. are clustered at the district and electoral area level. T-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
VARIABLES
Female 0.019 0.044** 0.015 0.017 0.007 0.005 0.011 0.006 0.005 0.005
(1.07) (2.52) (0.84) (0.97) (0.39) (0.52) (1.18) (0.62) (0.49) (0.49)
Urban district 0.026 0.024 0.026 0.025 0.032* 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.001 0.004
(1.62) (1.61) (1.59) (1.50) (1.97) (0.44) (0.45) (0.51) (0.12) (0.46)
Education level 0.009*** -0.003 0.010*** 0.008** 0.009*** 0.005** 0.001 0.005** 0.004* 0.004*
(2.91) (-0.95) (3.22) (2.52) (2.91) (2.06) (0.39) (2.04) (1.79) (1.92)
Oil  or mining nearby 0.072*** 0.034 0.073*** 0.070*** 0.082*** 0.054*** 0.038*** 0.057*** 0.056*** 0.057***
(2.94) (1.62) (2.96) (2.86) (3.32) (3.88) (3.24) (3.89) (3.91) (4.02)
Radio ownership 0.057*** 0.032* 0.053*** 0.066*** 0.065*** -0.005 -0.013 -0.006 0.003 -0.004
(3.14) (1.88) (2.78) (3.59) (3.19) (-0.40) (-1.06) (-0.42) (0.27) (-0.29)
TV ownership -0.002 -0.018 -0.003 -0.009 -0.013 0.009 0.004 0.008 0.007 0.008
(-0.12) (-0.91) (-0.13) (-0.43) (-0.60) (1.13) (0.56) (0.95) (0.82) (0.88)
Mobile phone ownership 0.017 0.011 0.011 0.019 0.012 -0.016 -0.019 -0.020 -0.018 -0.018
(0.57) (0.39) (0.33) (0.58) (0.38) (-0.81) (-0.93) (-0.87) (-0.81) (-0.84)
Political interest 0.021*** 0.012** 0.021*** 0.022*** 0.025*** 0.006** 0.004 0.007** 0.006** 0.006**
(3.65) (2.17) (3.57) (3.65) (4.21) (2.16) (1.28) (2.23) (2.25) (2.09)
District Assembly member 0.116*** 0.054* 0.116*** 0.121*** 0.117*** 0.081*** 0.061*** 0.080*** 0.081*** 0.081***
(4.25) (1.98) (4.21) (4.38) (4.27) (5.12) (3.86) (5.05) (5.07) (5.05)
Unit Committee member 0.098*** 0.081*** 0.101*** 0.089*** 0.102*** 0.054*** 0.048*** 0.053*** 0.050*** 0.060***
(4.54) (4.08) (4.45) (3.91) (4.61) (4.31) (3.91) (4.08) (3.88) (4.47)
Traditional leader 0.158*** 0.094*** 0.155*** 0.155*** 0.132*** 0.061*** 0.041*** 0.060*** 0.062*** 0.060***
(6.39) (4.00) (6.00) (6.22) (5.12) (4.77) (3.49) (4.47) (4.75) (4.56)
Opinion leader 0.039** 0.010 0.041** 0.037** 0.036* 0.046*** 0.037*** 0.047*** 0.044*** 0.048***















Not my responsibil ity 0.012** -0.002
(2.25) (-0.86)
Afraid of potential reprisals -0.012** -0.004
(-2.42) (-1.37)
No use -0.024*** -0.002
(-4.83) (-0.90)
Observations 3,425 3,416 3,337 3,285 3,265 3,427 3,418 3,340 3,287 3,268
Number of disricts 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120
R-squared 0.108 0.221 0.108 0.108 0.123 0.059 0.099 0.061 0.059 0.061
Satisfaction with government
Received information on 
revenue management 
Knowledge of institutions 
(dummy)
Knowledge of revenue 
management
Discussed use of resource revenues in past 12 months Contacted someone in past 12 months about handling of revenues
Own right to demand better 
handling of revenues
Own right to benefit from 
revenues
Local leaders right to a share 
of revenues
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We find that knowledge levels about the resource sector and revenue use have conflicting 
effects on UC representatives’ behavior, while information and knowledge of revenue 
management are positively linked to and DA members and chiefs’ behaviour.30 Satisfaction 
with the government is linked to more frequent discussions for UC and DA members. The 
conclusion seems to be that more information and better knowledge can both stimulate 
discussion, but also reduce the frequency of discussions, perhaps because of a sense of already 
having the necessary information and not seeing any way of using this information in the 
political debate. Overall, we get a picture of positive links in the full sample between behaviour, 
and greater information and better knowledge about revenues and their use.  
4.4 Discussion of results 
In sum, we confirm several of the findings from similar studies and find that information 
reception, subjective knowledge levels, attitudes and behavior depend very much on education 
levels and respondents’ social leadership status, as well as on ownership of information media 
and general interest in political issues. Personal experience with resource extraction, measured 
by the proximity to extractive activities, also increases information dissemination and 
knowledge levels; and it tends to decrease satisfaction with the handling of resource revenues, 
and lead to more discussion and active demand for accountability in our overall sample and 
among elected leaders. There are some gender differences, with women appearing less 
knowledgeable about what is going on in the resource sector or, more likely, less (more) prone 
to exaggerating (understating) their knowledge. Women are also on average more satisfied with 




                                                 
30 The negative association for UC members is not significant in the logistic regression (Appendix 6, Column 2). 
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Table 5. Leader behavior 
 
Notes: Table shows coefficients for OLS regressions. All specifications include regional dummies and a constant term (not shown). S.e. are clustered at the district and electoral 
area level. T-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
VARIABLES
Female -0.007 -0.005 0.013 0.019 -0.019 -0.088*** -0.088*** -0.089*** -0.091*** -0.101*** -0.173 -0.080 -0.186 -0.157 -0.155
(-0.46) (-0.31) (0.99) (1.05) (-1.27) (-6.31) (-6.65) (-6.61) (-6.07) (-7.32) (-1.40) (-0.70) (-1.51) (-1.28) (-1.19)
Urban district 0.032* 0.026 0.031 0.012 0.043** -0.025 -0.024 -0.026 -0.014 -0.028 0.020 0.018 0.037 0.020 0.029
(1.69) (1.47) (1.61) (0.75) (2.38) (-1.43) (-1.34) (-1.46) (-0.78) (-1.61) (0.30) (0.27) (0.52) (0.29) (0.43)
Education level -0.012** -0.014** -0.012* -0.001 -0.012* 0.029*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.030*** 0.027*** -0.018 -0.036* -0.017 -0.015 -0.023
(-2.06) (-2.34) (-1.95) (-0.21) (-1.87) (5.42) (5.67) (5.15) (5.58) (4.83) (-1.15) (-1.93) (-1.09) (-0.93) (-1.48)
Oil or mining nearby 0.116*** 0.101*** 0.112*** 0.133*** 0.113*** 0.274*** 0.262*** 0.278*** 0.266*** 0.282*** 0.164 0.102 0.168 0.183 0.193
(8.92) (6.77) (8.12) (7.66) (8.16) (10.50) (9.93) (10.46) (10.43) (11.18) (1.23) (0.82) (1.33) (1.37) (1.43)
Radio ownership 0.009 0.008 0.001 -0.060** 0.004 0.036 0.027 0.034 0.048 0.044 0.075 0.052 0.087 0.074 0.091
(0.35) (0.30) (0.04) (-2.50) (0.14) (0.52) (0.42) (0.49) (0.73) (0.63) (0.65) (0.44) (0.70) (0.60) (0.71)
TV ownership -0.039 -0.041 -0.036 0.025 -0.050 -0.001 -0.003 0.003 -0.007 0.003 0.200** 0.187** 0.178* 0.202** 0.197*
(-1.00) (-1.07) (-0.89) (0.88) (-1.27) (-0.05) (-0.08) (0.11) (-0.23) (0.10) (2.02) (2.03) (1.79) (2.03) (1.84)
Mobile phone ownership 0.120*** 0.107*** 0.102*** 0.110*** 0.140*** 0.094** 0.082* 0.113** 0.093* 0.097** 0.088 0.059 0.103 0.082 0.070
(5.37) (4.26) (4.51) (5.13) (5.65) (2.06) (1.85) (2.37) (1.97) (2.11) (0.70) (0.47) (0.83) (0.66) (0.51)
Political interest 0.012** 0.010* 0.013** 0.003 0.008 0.005 0.002 0.007 0.002 0.010 -0.047*** -0.061*** -0.047*** -0.048** -0.048**















Not my responsibility 0.004 0.040*** -0.014
(0.65) (6.11) (-0.58)
Afraid of potential reprisals 0.023*** -0.005 0.010
(3.58) (-1.02) (0.43)
No use -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.038
(-3.56) (-3.70) (-1.54)
Observations 593 592 577 520 566 556 556 550 551 544 375 374 364 365 362
Number of disricts 0.036 0.048 0.044 0.035 0.047 0.130 0.134 0.137 0.137 0.140 0.214 0.239 0.218 0.224 0.227
R-squared 120 120 120 110 120 113 113 113 113 113 102 102 101 102 100
Chief discussed revenue use with peers in past 12 monthsUC member discussed revenue use with peers in past 12 months DA member discussed revenue use with peers in past 12 months
Received information on revenue 
management 
Knowledge of institutions (dummy)
Knowledge of revenue management
Local leaders right to a share of 
revenues
Own right to benefit from revenues




More importantly for the purpose of our study, we find that what information has reached 
citizens can be linked to some differences in attitudes and behavior with regards to resource 
revenue management. While greater knowledge of the relevant institutions and revenue flows 
has significant but contradictory links with rights perceptions (and is not linked to satisfaction 
levels), we get a clear picture of (small) positive relations with behavior of greater information 
and better knowledge about revenues and their use in the full sample. However, the link with 
leaders’ behavior is more uncertain: information and knowledge levels affect elected 
representatives in both directions, while they have no discernible impact on traditional 
authorities, who instead seem mainly motivated by personal (monetary) interests. 
Finally, our results on low demand for accountability are consistent with findings on 
citizens’ demand for accountability emerging from other studies on citizens’ behavior in 
Ghana. For example, the Seventh Round of the Afrobarometer Survey revealed that an 
overwhelming majority of Ghanaians do not engage with their elected and non-elected leaders: 
an average of 76% of the citizenry surveyed indicated that they had never contacted any of 
their formal or informal leaders to demand accountability during the year preceding the survey. 
With specific reference to elected officials, 71% and 84% of respondents respectively said they 
had never contacted their local councillors (assembly members) or Members of Parliament over 
the 12 months preceding the survey, while 87% indicated that they had not contacted a 
government official over the same period (Duayeden and Armah-Attoh 2018).  
6. Concluding remarks 
Our analysis offers a first detailed evaluation of Ghanaians’ current state of knowledge on the 
use of Ghana’s resource revenues, and how knowledge levels are related to attitudes towards 
and demand for accountability regarding resource revenue management. This is particularly 
important given what are perceived to be model rules for transparency and accountability 
surrounding petroleum revenues in Ghana, which were introduced in 2011.  
Based on a unique survey dataset of over 3500 Ghanaians, gathered in 2016, we conclude 
that information dissemination on resource revenues and how they are used has not been able 
to reach much of the population, and that even many duty bearers are poorly informed. This 
runs counter to one of the main mechanisms proposed by the transparency literature: the 
availability of information is in fact not linked to widespread high levels of knowledge of the 
issues. Knowledge levels about revenue use are also not systematically linked to attitudes 
towards current resource policy. It is difficult to judge to what extent the overall low 
satisfaction levels with the current situation are affected by Ghana’s often negative experience 
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with the management of mining revenues; differences in the responses for mining and 
petroleum revenues were negligible, suggesting that respondents either do not distinguish the 
categories, or are genuinely dissatisfied with the handling of all resource revenues.  
However, a more positive finding from our survey is that respondents with higher 
knowledge levels have on average more frequently discussed revenue-related issues with 
family, friends, or colleagues; and they are more likely to have approached someone to get 
more information on the use of revenues. This higher willingness to enter into debate and 
demand more accountability does lend some support to these steps in the transparency 
narrative.  
In the context of Ghana’s transparency policy, we could say that these mixed results imply 
that there is room for improvement both in disseminating information relating to resource 
revenue use, and in encouraging citizens to voice their concerns. However, perhaps the 
transparency discourse itself is too ambitious and optimistic in its assumptions. Rather than 
call for greater efforts in creating transparency for all, with the idea that this will quasi-
automatically lead to greater awareness and demand for accountable use of resources, it is time 
to consider targeting those groups in society most likely to act as effective intermediaries 
between citizens and duty bearers, for example civil society and non-governmental 
organizations. Such a policy could complement the current general transparency efforts 
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Received information on revenue 
management, overall 
3519 0.31 0.46 0 1 Combination of next two questions. Dummy: 1 Received information. 
in Ghana 3492 0.31 0.46 0 1 Have you in the past year received or heard any information about how revenues from oil, gas or mining are 
handled in Ghana (from anybody or just any source)? Dummy: 1 Yes. 
in local area 3487 0.07 0.25 0 1 Have you in the past year received or heard any information about how revenues from oil, gas or mining are 
handled in your area (from anybody or just any source)? Dummy: 1 Yes. 
Knowledge of institutions 3515 0.77 1.01 0 4 Have you heard about ___? A separate question for each relevant institution: PRMA, PIAC, ABFA, GHEITI. Count: 
0 None, 1 One, 2 Two, 3  three, 4 All four. 
Knowledge of oil revenue management  3509 0.38 0.58 0 3 How would you characterise your knowledge about what happens to revenues from oil and gas production? 
Scale:  0 No knowledge, 1 Little knowledge, 2 Some knowledge, 3 Good knowledge. 
Knowledge of mining revenue 
management 






Oil revenue management satisfaction 2919 0.81 1.34 0 4 Ghana earns substantial revenues from oil and gas. In general, how satisfied are you with how these revenues 
are handled? Scale: 0 Completely dissatisfied, 1 Somewhat dissatisfied, 2 Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied, 3 
Somewhat satisfied, 4 Completely satisfied. 
Mining revenue management satisfaction 2966 0.77 1.32 0 4 Ghana earns substantial revenues from mining. In general, how satisfied are you with how these revenues are 
handled? Scale: as above.  
Local leaders right to a share of revenues 3470 2.25 1.53 0 4 I believe that / (Q1) traditional leaders / (Q2) local politicians and officials / have a right to obtain a share of oil, 
gas or mining revenues as a compensation for their service. The variable codes the mean of the questions Q1 and 
Q2, ignoring missing values. Scale: 0 Completely disagree, 1 Somewhat disagree, 2 Neither agree nor disagree, 3 
Somewhat agree, 4 Completely agree.  
Right to benefit from revenues 3476 3.91 0.40 0 4 To what extent do you agree with the following statements? You have a right to benefit from the oil and gas 
revenues Ghana receives. Scale: 0 Completely disagree, 1 Somewhat disagree, 2 Neither agree nor disagree, 3 
Somewhat agree, 4 Completely agree. 
Right to demand information about 
revenues 
3462 3.82 0.58 0 4 You have a right to demand information about oil, gas or mining revenues from responsible national officials and 
leaders. Scale: see above. 
Right to demand better handling of 
revenues 
3464 3.82 0.60 0 4 You have a right to demand better handling of oil, gas and mining revenues from responsible national officials 






Discussed use of resource revenues with 
friends, family or colleagues in past 12 
months 
3502 0.20 0.40 0 1 In the past 12 months have you discussed usage of revenues from oil, gas and mining with your family, friends or 
colleagues? Dummy: 1 Yes. 
Contacted someone in past 12 months 
about handling of revenues 
3505 0.06 0.24 0 1 In the past 12 months have you contacted anybody to ask about how revenues from oil, gas or mining are 
handled in Ghana or in your area? Dummy: 1 Yes. 
UC member discussed revenue use in UC 
meeting in past 12 months 
603 0.10 0.46 0 3 In the past 12 months, did you discuss revenues from oil, gas of mining during your Unit Committee (internal) 
meetings? Scale: 0 Never, 1 Once, 2 2-3 times, 3 More than 3 times.  
DA member discussed revenue use in DA 
meeting in past 12 months 
557 0.14 0.52 0 3 In the past 12 months, did you discuss revenues from oil, gas or mining during your District Assembly (internal) 
meetings? Scale: see above.  
Traditional authorities discussed revenue 
use with peers in past 12 months 
383 0.28 0.77 0 3 In the past 12 months, did you discuss revenues from oil, gas or mining with other traditional leaders in your 













Female 3518 0.22 0.41 0 1 Are you a male or female? Dummy: 1 Yes. 
Urban district 3526 0.46 0.50 0 1 Is the area mostly rural or urban? Coded by the enumerator; 0 Mainly rural, 1 Mainly urban. 
Education level 3513 4.57 2.59 0 8 What is your highest level of education? Scale from 0 None to 8 Completed tertiary. 
Oil or mining nearby 3469 0.18 0.39 0 1 To your knowledge, does any mining or oil company operate in or nearby your area? Dummy: 1 Yes. 
Radio ownership 3516 0.93 0.26 0 1 Do you or a household member have radio? Dummy: 1 Yes. 
TV ownership 3517 0.85 0.36 0 1 Do you or a household member have television? Dummy: 1 Yes. 
Mobile phone ownership 3517 0.97 0.17 0 1 Do you or a household member have mobile phone? Dummy: 1 Yes. 
Political interest 3495 2.39 1.68 0 5 How often do you discuss political matters and public affairs with friends, family or colleagues? Scale: 0 Never, 1 
Rarely, 2 Sometimes, 3 Often, 4 Very often, 5 All the time. 
District Assembly member 3526 0.16 0.37 0 1 Coded by the enumerator. Dummy: 1 Yes. 
Unit Committee member 3526 0.17 0.38 0 1 Coded by the enumerator. Dummy: 1 Yes. 
Traditional leader 3526 0.11 0.31 0 1 Coded by the enumerator. Dummy: 1 Yes. 
Opinion leader  3526 0.22 0.41 0 1 Coded by the enumerator. Dummy: 1 Yes. 
Knowledge of institutions (dummy) 3515 0.46 0.50 0 1 Have you heard about ___? A separate question for each relevant institution: PRMA, PIAC, ABFA, GHEITI. 
Dummy: 1 Had heard of at least one. 
Knowledge of revenue management 3510 0.38 0.57 0 3 How would you characterise your knowledge about what happens to revenues from / oil and gas production / 
mining? The variable codes the mean of the two variables, ignoring missing values. Scale:  0 No knowledge, 1 
Little knowledge, 2 Some knowledge, 3 Good knowledge. 
Satisfaction with government 3367 1.08 1.41 0 4 To what extent do you agree with the following statements: Current government is doing a very good job in / 
improving the living standards of the poor / keeping prices down / creating jobs. The variable codes the mean of 
the three variables, ignoring missing values. When response to all three questions are missing, the variable is set 
to missing. Scale: 0 Completely disagree, 1 Somewhat disagree, 2 Neither agree nor disagree, 3 Somewhat agree, 
4 Completely agree.  
Not my responsibility  3449 1.20 1.67 0 4 It is not my responsibility to improve the way revenues from oil, gas and mining are handled. Scale: see above. 
Afraid of potential reprisals  3421 0.82 1.43 0 4 I am afraid of potential reprisals if I tried to challenge the way how revenues from oil, gas and mining are 
handled. Scale: see above. 
No use 3385 2.08 1.81 0 4 Even if I tried to get information about oil, gas or mining revenues from people above me, I would not receive 




Appendix 2. Knowledge of resource revenues and institutions, logistic and ordered logistic estimations of the models in Table 1 
 
 
Notes: Table shows odd ratios for logistic (columns 1-3) and ordered logistic regressions (columns 4-6). All specifications include regional dummies and columns 1-3 a constant term 
(not shown). S.e. are clustered at the district and electoral area level. T-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Combined In Ghana In own area Instutions Oil revenues
Mining 
revenues
Female 0.954 0.934 1.064 0.375*** 0.611*** 0.625***
(-0.39) (-0.57) (0.29) (-8.95) (-3.43) (-3.15)
Urban district 0.983 1.011 0.809 1.102 1.067 1.117
(-0.16) (0.10) (-1.09) (0.97) (0.58) (0.96)
Education level 1.087*** 1.087*** 1.013 1.360*** 1.214*** 1.204***
(3.40) (3.36) (0.35) (13.39) (7.76) (6.93)
Oil or mining nearby 1.668*** 1.618*** 2.337*** 1.203 1.293* 1.670***
(3.58) (3.41) (3.91) (1.34) (1.81) (3.66)
Radio ownership 1.949*** 1.940** 2.672* 1.395 2.026** 2.010**
(2.67) (2.57) (1.98) (1.60) (2.41) (2.52)
TV ownership 1.231 1.213 1.562 1.245 1.238 1.630**
(1.22) (1.11) (1.58) (1.38) (1.17) (2.61)
Mobile phone ownership 0.926 0.924 0.447* 2.308* 2.852* 2.400*
(-0.24) (-0.24) (-1.86) (1.85) (1.93) (1.71)
Political interest 1.112*** 1.106** 1.091 1.034 1.234*** 1.196***
(2.84) (2.61) (1.39) (1.09) (6.47) (5.28)
District Assembly member 1.884*** 1.931*** 0.529** 1.247* 1.988*** 2.230***
(3.84) (4.00) (-2.35) (1.71) (4.57) (5.31)
Unit Committee member 1.109 1.177 0.359*** 1.305** 1.491*** 1.784***
(0.69) (1.09) (-3.81) (2.19) (2.80) (3.84)
Traditional leader 2.986*** 3.083*** 1.601* 1.316* 2.485*** 3.140***
(7.31) (7.47) (1.77) (1.87) (5.47) (6.56)
Opinion leader 1.517*** 1.561*** 1.851*** 0.926 1.786*** 2.095***
(2.92) (3.11) (2.80) (-0.72) (3.75) (4.76)
Observations 3,440 3,414 3,411 3,437 3,431 3,428
Number of disricts 120 120 120 120 120 120
Information on oil and mining Knowledge
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Appendix 3. Satisfaction with resource revenue management, ordered logistic estimations of the models in Table 2 
 
 
Notes: Table shows odd ratios for ordered logistic regressions. All specifications include regional dummies. S.e. are clustered at the district and electoral area level. T-statistics in 
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Oil Oil Oil Mining Mining Mining 
Female 1.199 1.174 1.629*** 1.326** 1.303* 1.831***
(1.29) (1.10) (3.32) (1.99) (1.80) (4.05)
Urban district 0.952 0.957 0.956 0.985 0.987 1.027
(-0.40) (-0.37) (-0.36) (-0.13) (-0.11) (0.21)
Education level 1.043* 1.041 1.029 1.002 1.000 0.988
(1.77) (1.50) (1.09) (0.09) (0.00) (-0.50)
Oil or mining nearby 0.711** 0.673** 0.671** 0.708** 0.677** 0.673**
(-2.11) (-2.41) (-2.23) (-2.32) (-2.56) (-2.28)
Radio ownership 0.710 0.696* 0.784 0.672* 0.663* 0.717
(-1.65) (-1.74) (-0.94) (-1.84) (-1.90) (-1.28)
TV ownership 0.784* 0.783* 0.907 0.838 0.836 1.016
(-1.71) (-1.71) (-0.62) (-1.17) (-1.19) (0.09)
Mobile phone ownership 0.621* 0.622* 0.729 1.045 1.053 1.213
(-1.94) (-1.93) (-0.97) (0.16) (0.19) (0.50)
Political interest 0.827*** 0.822*** 0.876*** 0.826*** 0.821*** 0.873***
(-4.39) (-4.52) (-3.00) (-4.69) (-4.83) (-3.36)
District Assembly member 1.304 1.259 0.948 1.477** 1.422* 1.084
(1.60) (1.36) (-0.30) (2.21) (1.96) (0.44)
Unit Committee member 1.488** 1.474** 1.362* 1.546*** 1.527*** 1.307
(2.53) (2.45) (1.75) (2.73) (2.63) (1.49)
Traditional leader 0.849 0.803 0.834 0.919 0.872 0.943
(-0.86) (-1.13) (-0.87) (-0.45) (-0.71) (-0.29)
Opinion leader 1.583*** 1.554*** 1.394** 1.626*** 1.589*** 1.461**









Observations 2,869 2,862 2,779 2,910 2,903 2,818
Number of disricts 120 120 120 120 120 120
Received information on 
revenue management 
Knowledge of institutions 
(dummy)





Appendix 4. Rights perception, ordered logistic estimations of the models in Table 3 
 
Notes: Table shows odd ratios for logistic regressions. All specifications include regional dummies and a constant term (not shown). S.e. are clustered at the district and electoral 
area level. T-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
VARIABLES
Female 0.885 -0.053 -0.095 0.885 0.852 0.969 0.498*** 0.513*** 0.541*** 0.516*** 0.521*** 0.554***
(-1.18) (-0.50) (-0.89) (-0.47) (-0.61) (-0.13) (-4.45) (-4.22) (-3.86) (-4.37) (-4.27) (-3.79)
Urban district 1.101 0.092 0.089 0.939 0.956 0.938 0.849 0.853 0.865 0.931 0.940 0.947
(1.06) (1.00) (0.98) (-0.32) (-0.23) (-0.31) (-1.12) (-1.07) (-0.98) (-0.47) (-0.40) (-0.36)
Education level 0.951*** -0.068*** -0.042** 1.057 1.080* 1.064 1.141*** 1.129*** 1.129*** 1.146*** 1.144*** 1.137***
(-2.65) (-3.31) (-2.20) (1.43) (1.79) (1.62) (4.07) (3.57) (3.84) (4.32) (4.00) (4.18)
Oil or mining nearby 1.022 0.021 -0.033 1.367 1.403 1.368 1.018 1.037 1.175 1.096 1.143 1.292
(0.18) (0.17) (-0.25) (1.13) (1.19) (1.10) (0.08) (0.16) (0.76) (0.38) (0.54) (1.08)
Radio ownership 1.448** 0.363** 0.397** 0.360*** 0.376** 0.447** 0.483** 0.495** 0.596* 0.436*** 0.452*** 0.520**
(2.23) (2.19) (2.27) (-2.69) (-2.57) (-2.10) (-2.57) (-2.47) (-1.83) (-2.77) (-2.63) (-2.16)
TV ownership 0.901 -0.121 -0.070 0.729 0.744 0.835 1.040 1.033 0.989 1.036 1.041 1.009
(-0.91) (-1.04) (-0.60) (-1.14) (-1.06) (-0.65) (0.20) (0.17) (-0.06) (0.19) (0.21) (0.05)
Mobile phone ownership 0.884 -0.145 -0.123 1.012 1.022 1.165 1.074 1.078 1.257 0.841 0.838 0.930
(-0.54) (-0.64) (-0.53) (0.03) (0.05) (0.34) (0.22) (0.23) (0.71) (-0.49) (-0.50) (-0.21)
Political interest 0.885*** -0.125*** -0.103*** 1.128** 1.147** 1.170*** 1.016 1.022 1.021 1.064 1.076 1.054
(-3.66) (-3.69) (-3.09) (2.16) (2.44) (2.62) (0.31) (0.42) (0.40) (1.26) (1.46) (1.03)
District Assembly member 1.212 0.154 0.124 8.581*** 9.791*** 6.706*** 10.456*** 10.866*** 9.605*** 9.662*** 10.415*** 9.176***
(1.18) (0.98) (0.76) (5.08) (5.19) (4.47) (5.78) (5.83) (5.55) (5.85) (5.97) (5.64)
Unit Committee member 2.234*** 0.787*** 0.689*** 1.237 1.253 0.928 2.110*** 2.097*** 1.843** 2.091*** 2.080*** 1.800**
(6.02) (5.87) (4.94) (0.72) (0.74) (-0.25) (3.03) (2.95) (2.36) (2.93) (2.85) (2.26)
Traditional leader 2.254*** 0.819*** 0.806*** 32.041*** 35.532*** 30.836*** 0.985 1.023 0.929 1.099 1.174 1.052
(5.59) (5.46) (5.55) (3.44) (3.56) (3.41) (-0.06) (0.08) (-0.27) (0.33) (0.55) (0.17)
Opinion leader 0.974 -0.027 -0.066 0.783 0.826 0.708 0.818 0.851 0.746* 0.815 0.857 0.753
(-0.22) (-0.22) (-0.52) (-1.08) (-0.82) (-1.57) (-1.19) (-0.93) (-1.69) (-1.22) (-0.89) (-1.65)
0.043 0.800 1.008 0.881
(0.45) (-0.95) (0.04) (-0.71)
0.345*** 0.907 1.417** 1.342*
(3.47) (-0.46) (2.20) (1.88)
-0.017 0.734 0.712* 0.669**
(-0.19) (-1.23) (-1.96) (-2.48)
0.087** 1.487*** 1.164*** 1.128**
(2.62) (4.95) (2.63) (2.01)
Observations 3,394 3,384 3,259 3,400 3,390 3,263 3,388 3,378 3,251 3,390 3,380 3,253
Number of disricts 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120
Right to demand better handlingLocal leaders right to revenues
Knowledge of institutions (dummy)
Knowledge of revenue management
Satisfaction with government
Received information on revenue 
management 
Own right to benefits Right to demand information
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Appendix 5. Individual behaviour, full sample; logistic estimations of models in Table 4 
 
Notes: Table shows odd ratios for logistic regressions. All specifications include regional dummies. S.e. are clustered at the district and electoral area level. T-statistics in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
VARIABLES
Female 1.171 1.459** 1.133 1.153 1.066 1.084 1.397 1.117 1.064 1.135
(1.01) (2.03) (0.77) (0.90) (0.38) (0.25) (0.88) (0.35) (0.19) (0.38)
Urban district 1.270* 1.327* 1.272* 1.255 1.306* 1.244 1.350 1.251 1.158 1.232
(1.75) (1.86) (1.73) (1.64) (1.93) (0.88) (1.15) (0.91) (0.59) (0.87)
Education level 1.080*** 0.970 1.090*** 1.069** 1.079*** 1.167** 1.047 1.161** 1.147* 1.153**
(2.82) (-0.95) (3.09) (2.44) (2.84) (2.14) (0.53) (2.10) (1.84) (2.03)
Oil or mining nearby 1.644*** 1.273 1.676*** 1.621*** 1.800*** 3.195*** 2.379*** 3.165*** 3.417*** 3.265***
(3.10) (1.48) (3.20) (3.02) (3.58) (4.59) (3.71) (4.51) (4.80) (4.59)
Radio ownership 2.604** 2.202** 2.459** 3.002*** 2.756** 0.810 0.644 0.815 1.193 0.818
(2.49) (2.12) (2.33) (2.69) (2.55) (-0.41) (-0.84) (-0.40) (0.29) (-0.40)
TV ownership 0.968 0.858 0.958 0.900 0.881 1.259 1.088 1.222 1.124 1.229
(-0.15) (-0.65) (-0.19) (-0.47) (-0.58) (0.57) (0.21) (0.50) (0.29) (0.51)
Mobile phone ownership 1.356 1.334 1.167 1.329 1.325 0.521 0.377 0.464 0.463 0.492
(0.65) (0.61) (0.33) (0.61) (0.59) (-0.75) (-1.07) (-0.89) (-0.93) (-0.82)
Political interest 1.186*** 1.103* 1.189*** 1.188*** 1.223*** 1.191** 1.103 1.203** 1.207** 1.182**
(3.51) (1.74) (3.52) (3.48) (4.21) (2.22) (1.15) (2.31) (2.38) (2.02)
District Assembly member 2.049*** 1.488* 2.039*** 2.126*** 2.052*** 4.710*** 4.279*** 4.677*** 4.871*** 4.435***
(3.97) (1.94) (3.90) (4.12) (3.88) (3.90) (3.52) (3.94) (3.80) (3.86)
Unit Committee member 2.315*** 2.237*** 2.267*** 2.190*** 2.346*** 4.899*** 5.435*** 4.467*** 4.927*** 5.448***
(5.27) (4.71) (4.91) (4.56) (5.29) (4.77) (4.73) (4.57) (4.46) (5.09)
Traditional leader 3.141*** 2.023*** 2.926*** 3.052*** 2.406*** 7.331*** 4.500*** 6.620*** 7.697*** 6.760***
(6.71) (3.47) (5.93) (6.50) (4.67) (6.16) (4.22) (5.74) (6.05) (5.50)
Opinion leader 1.425** 1.045 1.480** 1.406** 1.339* 4.531*** 4.104*** 4.595*** 4.500*** 4.379***















Not my responsibility 1.104** 0.930
(2.21) (-0.87)
Afraid of potential reprisals 0.869** 0.915
(-2.56) (-0.92)
No use 0.825*** 0.998
(-4.57) (-0.03)
Observations 3,425 3,416 3,337 3,285 3,265 3,427 3,418 3,340 3,287 3,268
Number of disricts 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120
Discussed use of resource revenues in past 12 months Contacted someone in past 12 months about handling of revenues
Own right to benefit from revenues
Received information on revenue 
management 
Knowledge of institutions (dummy)
Knowledge of revenue management
Local leaders right to a share of 
revenues




Appendix 6. Individual behaviour, leaders; logistic estimations of models in Table 5 
 
Notes: Table shows odd ratios for logistic regressions as ordered logistic regression not possible due to too few positive replies; For the estimations, a binary outcome is used in which 
‘no’ denotes 0 and 1 is coded for positive replies. All specifications include regional dummies and a constant term (not shown). S.e. are clustered at the district and electoral area 
level. T-statistics in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
VARIABLES
Female 0.764 0.777 0.961 0.879 0.627* 0.776 1.561 0.560 0.816 0.894
(-1.12) (-1.01) (-0.17) (-0.44) (-1.88) (-0.21) (0.41) (-0.57) (-0.17) (-0.09)
Urban district 1.443* 1.360 1.452 1.301 1.776** 0.867 0.891 0.882 0.981 0.858 1.195 1.114 1.307 1.184 1.304
(1.75) (1.50) (1.62) (1.23) (2.61) (-0.89) (-0.69) (-0.74) (-0.11) (-0.98) (0.52) (0.31) (0.76) (0.47) (0.77)
Education level 0.937 0.912 0.946 1.006 0.951 1.368*** 1.398*** 1.374*** 1.360*** 1.329*** 0.977 0.876 0.980 0.988 0.938
(-1.25) (-1.66) (-1.01) (0.09) (-0.83) (6.07) (6.50) (6.35) (5.95) (5.23) (-0.34) (-1.53) (-0.28) (-0.17) (-0.93)
Oil or mining nearby 2.154*** 1.910*** 1.999*** 2.288*** 1.994*** 3.363*** 3.107*** 3.384*** 3.473*** 3.510*** 2.726* 1.727 2.837* 3.051* 3.151*
(4.31) (3.49) (3.42) (3.88) (3.27) (8.80) (8.21) (8.36) (8.99) (8.70) (1.78) (0.93) (1.86) (1.97) (1.97)
Radio ownership 1.113 1.125 1.035 0.513*** 1.035 0.866 0.665 0.600 1.397 0.759 1.786 1.589 1.705 1.683 1.822
(0.45) (0.47) (0.12) (-2.79) (0.12) (-0.15) (-0.48) (-0.54) (0.31) (-0.30) (0.77) (0.60) (0.68) (0.68) (0.77)
TV ownership 0.628 0.623 0.631 0.949 0.560 0.696 0.733 0.694 0.603 0.700 2.268 2.313* 2.145 2.311 2.232
(-1.22) (-1.21) (-1.13) (-0.11) (-1.37) (-0.52) (-0.49) (-0.55) (-0.75) (-0.49) (1.48) (1.66) (1.36) (1.51) (1.37)
Mobile phone ownership 2.582 1.931 2.994 2.627 2.379
(1.18) (0.80) (1.36) (1.23) (1.09)
Political interest 1.176*** 1.148** 1.156** 1.107** 1.106 1.008 0.967 1.024 0.976 1.038 0.741** 0.681*** 0.739** 0.738** 0.732**















Not my responsibility 1.116 1.238*** 0.889
(1.60) (3.91) (-0.96)
Afraid of potential reprisals 1.277*** 0.968 0.928
(3.64) (-0.65) (-0.22)
No use 0.787*** 0.812*** 0.819
(-3.42) (-4.69) (-1.14)
Observations 506 505 462 447 439 520 520 514 515 510 365 364 353 355 354
Number of disricts 104 104 95 96 94 113 113 113 113 113 96 96 94 96 94
UC member discussed revenue use with peers in past 12 months DA member discussed revenue use with peers in past 12 months Chief discussed revenue use with peers in past 12 months
Knowledge of institutions (dummy)
Knowledge of revenue management
Local leaders right to a share of 
revenues
Own right to benefit from revenues
Own right to demand better handling 
of revenues
Satisfaction with government
Received information on revenue 
management 
